Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76143
Authors: 
Gersbach, Hans
Schmutzler, Armin
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich 0214
Abstract: 
We develop a product market theory that explains why firms invest in general training of their workers. We consider a model where firms first decide whether to invest in general human capital, then make wage offers for each others' trained employees and finally engage in imperfect product market competition. Equilibria with and without training, and multiple equilibria can emerge. If competition is suffciently soft and trained workers are substitutes, firms may invest in non-specific training if others do the same, because they would otherwise suffer a competitive disadvantage or need to pay high wages in order to attract trained workers. Government intervention can be socially desirable to turn training into a focal equilibrium.
Subjects: 
general training
human capital
oligopoly
turnover
JEL: 
D42
L22
L43
L92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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