Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76142
Authors: 
Falkinger, Josef
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich 0811
Abstract: 
This paper analyses the equilibrium effects of individual information filters. Information is modelled as advertisements which are distributed across a population of consumers with heterogeneous preferences. An advertisement that provides knowledge about a product with little or no utility for a consumer is considered junk. Filters are characterised by their level of tolerance. The quality of the filter is measured in terms of the share of useful items in the total set of items passing the filter. It is shown that in conditions of decentralised competition, multiple equilibria arise. A social optimum can be achieved by demanding each consumer to reject a certain percentage of advertisements, leaving the choice of what is rejected up to the consumer him/herself.
Subjects: 
global information society
advertising
junk information
spam filter
internet regulation
JEL: 
D83
L86
M38
D18
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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