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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 0212
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine the competitive effects of the vertical integration of gasoline refineries and retailers in the U.S. Adapting the first-order condition approach of static oligopoly games to the analysis of vertically related oligopolies, we develop a novel framework for directly evaluating the strategic foreclosure effect and the effciency benefits associated with vertical integration. Applying this framework, we find significant evidence for both vertical foreclosure and effciency benefits. The foreclosure effect dominates the effciency benefits for more than half of the refining firms in the sample. Vertical foreclosure is found to increase the wholesale price of refined gasoline by 0.2 to 0.6 cents per gallon.
Schlagwörter: 
vertical integration
separation
foreclosure
market conduct
petroleum industry
JEL: 
L13
L22
L49
L71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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