Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76103
Authors: 
Napel, Stefan
Widgrén, Mika
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 736
Abstract: 
Traditional power indices ignore preferences and strategic interaction. Equilibrium analysis of particular non-cooperative decision procedures is unsuitable for normative analysis and assumes typically unavailable information. These points drive a lingering debate about the right approach to power analysis. A unified framework that works both sides of the street is developed here. It rests on a notion of a posteriori power which formalizes players' marginal impact to outcomes in cooperative and non-cooperative games, for strategic interaction and purely random behaviour. Taking expectations with respect to preferences, actions, and procedures then defines a meaningful a priori measure. Established indices turn out to be special cases.
Subjects: 
power indices
spatial voting
equilibrium analysis
decision procedures
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.