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Calmfors, Lars
Johansson, Åsa
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 761
Membership in a monetary union implies stronger incentives for nominal wage flexibility in the form of wage indexation and shorter contract length than nonmembership. For example, entry into a monetary union may cause a move from a non-indexation to an indexation equilibrium. But more wage flexibility is only an imperfect substitute for an own monetary policy. It is possible that an increase in wage flexibility is welfare-decreasing because of the accompanying rise in price variability. The interaction between wage setting and central bank behaviour may result in either multiple equilibria or a unique full-indexation equilibrium.
nominal wage flexibility
wage indexation
monetary union
asymmetric shocks
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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