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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 766
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper introduces two ideas, emotional state dependent utility components (ESDUCs), and evolutionary perfect Bayesian equilibrium (EPBE). Using a simple extensive form game, we illustrate the efficiency-enhancing role of a powerful ESDUC, the vengeance motive. Incorporating behavioral noise and observational noise leads to a range of (short run) Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) involving both vengeful and non-vengeful types. We then derive two (long run) EPBE, one where both types survive and reap mutual gains, and a second where only the non-vengeful type survives and there are no mutual gains.
Schlagwörter: 
negative reciprocity
perfect Bayesian equilibrium
evolutionary perfect Bayesian equilibrium
emotional state dependent utility
JEL: 
B52
C73
D64
Z13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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