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Autoren: 
Linnemer, Laurent
Datum: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 740
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies the welfare consequences of a vertical merger that raises rivals‘ costs when downstream competition is à la Cournot between firms with constant asymmetric marginal costs. The main result is that such a vertical merger can nevertheless improve welfare if it involves a downstream firm whose cost is “low enough“. This is because by raising the input price paid by the non-merging firms the merger thereby shifts production away from those relatively inefficient producers in favor of the more efficient firm. However there is a tradeoff between the gain in productive efficiency and the loss in consumers‘ surplus caused by a higher downstream price which follows a higher input price. It is also shown, through an example, that this result extends to price competition with differentiated products.
Schlagwörter: 
foreclosure
raising rival costs
Cournot
welfare
asymmetric costs
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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