Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75999
Authors: 
Lommerud, Kjell Erik
Meland, Frode
Sørgard, Lars
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 777
Abstract: 
In a two-country reciprocal dumping model, with one country unionized, we analyze how wage setting and firm location are influenced by trade liberalization. We show that trade liberalization can induce FDI, which is at odds with conventional theoretical wisdom and cannot happen in a corresponding model without unionization. FDI is undertaken partly to win a distributional battle with unionized labor, and the incentives to invest abroad can be too large seen from a welfare point of view.
Subjects: 
unionized oligopoly
economic integration
foreign direct investment
JEL: 
D43
F15
F21
J51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.