Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75997
Authors: 
Konrad, Kai A.
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 698
Abstract: 
In many situations the individuals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output. This paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest. Depending on the advantages, an increase in the productivity of the investment can decrease or increase the amount of investment. The results are applied to autocrats' investment behavior and job specific investment in organizations.
Subjects: 
investment
endogenous property rights
contests
incumbency advantage
proprietary states
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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