Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/75964 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 691
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This short paper reconsiders the popular result that the lower the probability of getting reelected, the stronger the incumbent politicians' incentive to follow short-sighted, inefficient policies. The set-up is a general equilibrium model of endogenous growth and optimal fiscal policy, in which two political parties can alternate in power. We show that re-election uncertainty is not enough to produce the popular result. Specifically, re-election uncertainty must be combined with the hypothesis that politicians care about economic outcomes more when in power than when out of power, and - more importantly - that this preference over being in power is ad hoc. That is, if politicians can also choose how much to care about economic outcomes when in and out of power, it is optimal to care the same and hence shortsighted policies do not arise. Therefore, such policies presuppose a degree of irrationality on the part of political parties.
Schlagwörter: 
politics
fiscal policy
economic growth
general equilibrium
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
164.42 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.