Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75955
Authors: 
Bouckaert, Jan
Degryse, Hans
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 782
Abstract: 
We show that competing firms relax overall competition by lowering future barriers to entry. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclose borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to enter their market. Disclosure of borrower information increases an entrant's second-period profits. This dampens competition for serving the first-period market
Subjects: 
barriers to entry
asymmetric information
switching costs
banking competition.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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