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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 631
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper shows how the distribution of the ownership of multinational companies and the labour market conditions, especially the wage formation process, influence the outcome of interjurisdictional tax competition and coordination. In particular, it sets forth that equilibrium corporate tax rate can be negative, being a subsidy to the mobile factor, financed through a tax on the immobile one, and that foreign ownership of companies enables a jurisdiction which behaves non-cooperatively to export its tax burden through a too large tax rate on profits on its territory.
Schlagwörter: 
tax competition
tax coordination
multinational firm
foreign ownership
labour market
wage formation
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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