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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 406
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and elections can alleviate such inefficient decision-making in politics. This mechanism still works if the public cannot commit itself to a reelection scheme or if the public is unsure about the politicians' time preferences. In the non-commitment case, incentive contracts may need to include a golden parachute clause.Keywords: Incentive contracts, politicians, long-term policies, elections and contracts, golden parachute clause
Schlagwörter: 
Incentive contracts
politicians
long-term policies
elections and contracts
golden parachute clause
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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