Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75841
Authors: 
Falk, Armin
Fehr, Ernst
Fischbacher, Urs
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 474
Abstract: 
In this paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. However, when communication or informal sanctions are available appropriation behavior is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences.
Subjects: 
Common pool resources
experiments
fairness
reciprocity
game theory
fairness models
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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