Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75814
Authors: 
Bodenstein, Martin
Ursprung, Heinrich
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 501
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the behavior of rent-seeking politicians in an environment of increasing economic integration. The focus of the paper is on the implications of globalization-induced political yardstick competition for constitutional design with a view to the current discussion in the European Union. In contrast to the established literature, we carefully portray the double-tiered government structure in federal systems. The number of lower-tier governments and the allocation of policy responsibilities to the two levels of government are subject to constitutional choice.
Subjects: 
Economic Integration
Federalism
Political Economy
Yardstick Competition
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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