Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75740
Authors: 
Grimm, Veronika
Riedel, Frank
Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 584
Abstract: 
The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same time achieved a more competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and presents a game theoretic explanation of observed events during the crucial phase of that auction, which have puzzled several observers. In addition, the paper evaluates the merit of the German UMTS auction design, relative to the English design, that was predominantly employed in Europe.
Subjects: 
auctions
telecommunications
industrial organization
game theory.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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