Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75734
Authors: 
Grimm, Veronika
Riedel, Frank
Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 506
Abstract: 
The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction.The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending-bid auctions.In particular it is shown that the low price equilibrium that implements the efficient allocation is the unique perfect equilibrium of that game.
Subjects: 
Multi-unit auctions
spectrum auctions
telecomm-unications
industrial organization
game theory
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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