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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 481
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
In most European countries, money wages are given in collective agreements or individual employment contracts, and the employer cannot unilaterally cut wages, even after the expiration of a collective agreement. Ceteris paribus, workers have a stronger bargaining position when they try to prevent a cut in money wages. If inflation is so low that some money wages have to be cut, workers‘ stronger bargaining position requires higher unemployment in equilibrium. However, inflation is more stable when money wage rigidity binds, providing an incentive for monetary policy makers to choose a low target for inflation, which is easier to fulfil.
Schlagwörter: 
Nominal wage rigidity
labour contracts
monetary policy
inflation
equilibrium unemployment
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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