Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/75670 
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 308
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
By vetoing one questions mutually efficient agreements. On the other hand the threat of vetoing may prevent exploitation. Based on a generalization of ultimatum bargaining (Suleiman, 1996) we first elicit the responders' certainty equivalents for three different degrees of veto power. Afterwards the corresponding bargaining rule is implemented. The experimental data reveal that proposers are afraid of more veto power but that responders only care for commanding veto power at all, not for its strength.
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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