Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75667
Authors: 
Feld, Lars P.
Frey, Bruno S.
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 322
Abstract: 
Tax compliance has been studied in economics by analysing the individual decision of a representative person between paying and evading taxes. A neglected aspect of tax compliance is the interaction of taxpayers and tax authorities. The relationship between the two actors can be understood as an implicit or psychological contract. The more strongly the political participation rights are developed, the more important this contract is, and the higher tax morale is. In this paper, empirical evidence based on a survey of tax authorities of the 26 Swiss states (cantons) is presented, indicating that the differences in the treatment of taxpayers by tax authorities can be explained by differences in political participation rights.
Subjects: 
Tax evasion
tax authority
tax compliance
direct democracy
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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