Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75661
Authors: 
Plasmans, Joseph
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 287
Abstract: 
We construct an asymmetri c duopolistic R&D and production behavior model subject to knowledge spillovers. This model is an extension to the symmetric model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (A&J (1988)) and aims to determine the cooperative and non-cooperative R&D strategies for two agents of different size. The paper concludes that the introduction of asymmetry into the A&J (1988) model leads to different R&D expenditures and production decisions made by the firms. Simulations show that the bigger agent has larger R&D expenditures and higher output. If firms choose the monopoly collusion or the welfare-maximizing strategy, the optimal solution implies that R&D is conducted asymmetrically by both agents, but that production is conducted only by the largest agent.
Subjects: 
Innovation
R&D
spillovers
cooperation
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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