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Erscheinungsjahr: 
1999
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 202
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
It may be in the interest of low-ability individuals to subsidize the education of high-ability individuals. Sufficient conditions are surprisingly mild: positive externalities in education and complementarity in production between human capital and labor supllied by the low-ability individuals. However, tax competition and the free mobility of the educated give rise to time-inconsistency and free-riding problems which render such a social contract infeasible and result in a subotimally low investment in education.
Schlagwörter: 
Externalities in education
complementarity
social contract
tax competition
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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