Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/75560 
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 291
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
In this paper we endogenize the number and characteristics of lobbies in a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy where citizens can lobby an elected policy-maker. We find that lobbying always matters. That is, lobbying always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. Moreover, only one policy outcome emerges in equilibrium. An extremist candidate is elected and implements a centrist policy that differs from the one most preferred by the median voter. These results are in contrast with the ones obtained in the context of a citizen-candidate model where lobbies are exogenous.
Subjects: 
Lobbying
citizen-candidate
representative democracy
electoral competition
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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