Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75560
Authors: 
Felli, Leonardo
Merlo, Antonio M.
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 291
Abstract: 
In this paper we endogenize the number and characteristics of lobbies in a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy where citizens can lobby an elected policy-maker. We find that lobbying always matters. That is, lobbying always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. Moreover, only one policy outcome emerges in equilibrium. An extremist candidate is elected and implements a centrist policy that differs from the one most preferred by the median voter. These results are in contrast with the ones obtained in the context of a citizen-candidate model where lobbies are exogenous.
Subjects: 
Lobbying
citizen-candidate
representative democracy
electoral competition
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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