Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75539
Authors: 
Perry, Motty
Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Zamir, Shmuel
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 249
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion.
Subjects: 
Auctions
JEL: 
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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