Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75504
Authors: 
Jeitschko, Thomas D.
Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 258
Abstract: 
We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the well-known static optimum, and sketch the impact of information spillovers.
Subjects: 
Auctions
procurement
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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