Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/75480 
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 269
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clark-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected social surplus and expected tax revenue, and show that these mechanisms generally avoid budget deficits and prevent excessive entry.
Subjects: 
Mechanism design
natural oligopoly
auctions
entry
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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