Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/75283 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 99
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
Katz (1987), DeGraba (1990), and Yoshida (2000) have formulated theories that price discrimination bans in intermediary goods markets tend to have positive effects on allocative, dynamic and productive efficiency, respectively. We show that none of these results is robust vis-à-vis endogenous changes in downstream market structure. An upstream monopolist's ability to price discriminate can intensify competition through entry (by a technically inefficient entrant), resulting in socially preferable market outcomes. In contrast, discrimination bans tend to blockade entry of relatively inefficient firms , thereby strengthening downstream market concentration.
JEL: 
L13
D43
K31
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-098-7
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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