Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/74963 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
LICOS Discussion Paper No. 236
Publisher: 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, LICOS Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, Leuven
Abstract: 
This paper presents a political economy model of public standards in an open economy model. We use the model to derive the political optimum and to analyze different factors that have an influence on this political equilibrium. The paper discusses how the level of development influences the political equilibrium. We also analyze the relation between trade and the political equilibrium and compare this political outcome with the social optimum to identify under which cases `under-standardization?or `over-standardization?results, and which standards can be labeled as (producer)protectionist measures.
Subjects: 
standards
political economy
trade
development
JEL: 
F13
F59
H49
L15
O1
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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