Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74931
Authors: 
Olper, Alessandro
Raimondi, Valentina
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
LICOS Discussion Paper 305
Abstract: 
We investigate the effect of electoral rules and firms of government on public policy outcomes using a new dataset on agriculture and food policies from 74 countries over the 1960-2005 period. Using both cross-sectional and panel data analyses we find robust evidence that the specific nature of democratic institutions has important consequences for public policy. Proportional democracies and presidential democracies - compared to majoritarian and parliamentary democracies - give more public support to agriculture and less to food consumers. The magnitude of these constitutional effects are stronger for import-competitive sectors and staple food crops. The effects seem independent from the ideology orientation of governments.
Subjects: 
Electoral rules
forms of government
agriculture and food policy
political economy.
JEL: 
D72
F13
H23
O13
P16
Q18
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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