Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74822
Authors: 
Manousi, Vasiliki
Xepapadeas, Anastasios
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 41.2013
Abstract: 
We couple a spatially homogeneous energy balance climate model with an economic growth model which incorporates two potential policies against climate change: mitigation, which is the traditional policy, and geoengineering. We analyze the optimal policy mix of geoengineering and mitigation in both a cooperative and a noncooperative framework, in which we study open loop and feedback solutions. Our results suggests that greenhouse gas accumulation is relatively higher when geoengineering policies are undertaken, and that at noncooperative solutions incentives for geoengineering are relative stronger. A disruption of geoengineering efforts at a steady state will cause an upward jump in global temperature.
Subjects: 
Climate Change
Mitigation
Geoengineering
Cooperation
Differential Game
Open Loop - Feedback Nash Equilibrium
JEL: 
Q53
Q54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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