Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74787
Authors: 
Chen, Yan
Onur, Kesten
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2013-205
Abstract: 
We characterize a parametric family of application-rejection school choice mechanisms, including the Boston and Deferred Acceptance mechanisms as special cases, and spanning the parallel mechanisms for Chinese college admissions, the largest centralized matching in the world. Moving from one extreme member to the other results in systematic changes in manipulability, stability and welfare properties. Neither the ex-post dominance of the DA over the equilibria of Boston, nor the ex-ante dominance of Boston equilibria over the DA in stylized settings extends to the parallel mechanisms. In the laboratory, participants are most likely to reveal their preferences truthfully under the DA mechanism, followed by the Chinese parallel and then the Boston mechanisms. Furthermore, while the DA is significantly more stable than the Chinese parallel mechanism, which is more stable than Boston, efficiency comparisons vary across environments.
Subjects: 
school choice
Boston mechanism
Chinese parallel mechanism
deferred acceptance
experiment
JEL: 
C78
C92
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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