Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74644
Authors: 
Westkamp, Alexander
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 02/2012
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the sequential admissions procedure for medical subjects at public universities in Germany. Complete information equilibrium outcomes are shown to be characterized by a \emph{stability} condition that is adapted to the \emph{institutional constraints} of the German system. I introduce \emph{matching problems with complex constraints} and the notion of \emph{procedural stability}. Two simple assumptions guarantee existence of a student optimal procedurally stable matching mechanism that is strategyproof for students. n the context of the German admissions problem, this mechanism weakly Pareto dominates all equilibrium outcomes of the currently employed procedure. Applications to school choice with affirmative action are also discussed.
Subjects: 
University Admissions
Matching
Stability
Strategyproofness
Complex Constraints
JEL: 
C78
D02
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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