Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74538
Authors: 
Hüschelrath, Kai
Peyer, Sebastian
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers 13-029
Abstract: 
We investigate the relationship between public and private enforcers introducing a more differentiated approach. In contrast to the existing literature, we take into account that the costs and benefits of detection and prosecution and, thus, the usefulness of each enforcement mode may change with a variation of the type of anticompetitive conduct. We define a set of parameters that determine the costs and benefits of both types to enforce the antitrust laws and discuss implications for European competition law and policy.
Subjects: 
Competition policy
public enforcement
private enforcement
European Union
JEL: 
K21
L40
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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