Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74201
Authors: 
Nyborg, Kjell G.
Bindseil, Ulrich
Strebulaev, Ilya A.
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 92.2005
Abstract: 
Repo auctions are used to inject central bank funds against collateral into the banking sector. The ECB uses standard discriminatory auctions and hundreds of banks participate. The amount auctioned over the monthly reserve maintenance period is in principle exactly what banks collectively need to fulfil reserve requirements. We study bidder-level data and find: (i) Bidder behavior is different from what is documented for treasury auctions. Private information and the winner’s curse seem to be relatively unimportant. (ii) Underpricing is positively related to the difference between the interbank rate and the auction minimum bid rate, with the latter appearing to be a binding constraint. (iii) Bidders are more aggressive when the imbalance of awards in the previous auction is larger. (iv) Large bidders do better than small bidders. Some of our findings suggests that bidders are concerned with the loser’s nightmare and have limited amounts of the cheapest eligible collateral.
Subjects: 
Repo auctions
Multiunit auctions
Reserve requirements
Loser’s nightmare
Money markets
Central bank
Collateral
Open market operations
JEL: 
G21
G12
D44
E43
E50
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.