Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74181
Authors: 
Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni
Acocella, Nicola
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 132.2005
Abstract: 
This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.
Subjects: 
Policy games
policy ineffectiveness
static controllability
Nash equilibrium existence
JEL: 
C72
E52
E61
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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