Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74155
Authors: 
Montero, Maria
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 80.2006
Abstract: 
Inequity aversion models have been used to explain equitable payoff divisions in bargaining games. I show that inequity aversion can actually increase the asymmetry of payoff division if unanimity is not required. This is due to the analogy between inequity aversion and risk aversion. Inequity aversion may also affect comparative statics: the advantage of being proposer can decrease as players become more impatient.
Subjects: 
Noncooperative Bargaining
Coalition Formation
Inequity Aversion
JEL: 
A13
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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