Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/74150 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 32.2005
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
When assigning a concession contract, the regulator faces the issue of setting the concession length. Another key issue is whether or not the concessionare should be allowed to set the timing of new investments. In this paper we investigate the impact of concession length and investment timing flexibility on the concession value . It is generally argued that long-term contracts are privately valuable as they enable a concessionaire to increase her overall discounted returns. Moreover, the real option theory suggests that investment flexibility has an intrinsic value, as it allows concessionaires to avoid costly errors. By combining these two conventional wisdoms, one may argue that long- term contracts, which allow for investment timing flexibility, should always result in higher concession values. Our result suggests that this is not always the case. Firstly, investment flexibility does not always increase the concession value. Secondly, long-term contracts do not necessarily increase the concession value.
Schlagwörter: 
Concession contracts
Real option theory
Investment timing flexibility
Water utilities
JEL: 
D81
G31
L95
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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