Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74136
Authors: 
Finus, Michael
Rundshagen, Bianca
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 45.2005
Abstract: 
We analyze the formation of self-enforcing international environmental agreements under the assumption that countries announce their participation either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that a sequential formation process opens up possibilities for strategic behavior of countries that may lead to inferior outcomes in terms of global abatement and welfare. We then analyze whether and under which conditions a regulator like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordination and moderation, given that recommendations must be Pareto-improving to all parties.
Subjects: 
International environmental agreements
Timing of participation decision
Coalition theory
Role of international regulator
JEL: 
C72
D70
H41
Q50
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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