Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/74120 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 60.2007
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
Linking of repeated games and exchange of concessions in fields of relative strength may lead to more cooperation and to Pareto improvements relative to the situation where each game is played separately. In this paper we formalize these statements, provide some general results concerning the conditions for more cooperation and Pareto improvements to materialize or not and analyze the relation between both. Special attention is paid to the role of asymmetries.
Schlagwörter: 
Environmental Policy
Linking
Folk Theorem
Tensor Game
Prsioners' Dilemma
Full Cooperation
Pareto Efficiency
Minkowski Sum
Vector Maximum
Convex Analysis
JEL: 
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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