Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74120
Authors: 
von Mouche, Pierre
Folmer, Henk
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 60.2007
Abstract: 
Linking of repeated games and exchange of concessions in fields of relative strength may lead to more cooperation and to Pareto improvements relative to the situation where each game is played separately. In this paper we formalize these statements, provide some general results concerning the conditions for more cooperation and Pareto improvements to materialize or not and analyze the relation between both. Special attention is paid to the role of asymmetries.
Subjects: 
Environmental Policy
Linking
Folk Theorem
Tensor Game
Prsioners' Dilemma
Full Cooperation
Pareto Efficiency
Minkowski Sum
Vector Maximum
Convex Analysis
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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