Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74086
Authors: 
Savvateev, Alexei
Bogomolnaia, Anna
Le Breton, Michel
Weber, Shlomo
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 39.2005
Abstract: 
In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two principles, egalitarianism, that requires the equalization of the total cost for all agents in the same jurisdiction, and efficiency, that implies the minimization of the aggregate total cost within jurisdiction. We show that these two principles always yield a core-stable partition but a Nash stable partition may fail to exist.
Subjects: 
Jurisdictions
Stable partitions
Public projects
Egalitarianism
JEL: 
C71
C72
D63
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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