Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74026
Authors: 
Lahiri, Somdeb
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 19.2006
Abstract: 
In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. The main result of this paper states that every contract choice problem has a non-empty weak bargaining set. The need for such a solution concept which is considerably weaker than the core arises, since it is well known that even for very simple contract choice problems, the core may be empty. We also show by means of an example that the bargaining set due to Mas-Colell (1989), as well as a weaker version of it, may be empty for contract choice problems, thereby implying that the weakening we suggest is in some ways “tight”
Subjects: 
Weak bargaining set
Contract choice
NTU game
Matching
JEL: 
C78
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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