Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74015
Authors: 
Dimitrov, Dinko
Sung, Shao Chin
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 10.2006
Abstract: 
We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition tructures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition tructures always exist, and provide su¢ cient conditions for the existence of con- ractually Nash stable and weak individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games.
Subjects: 
Coalition formation
Hedonic games
Separability
Taxonomy
JEL: 
C71
A14
D20
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.