Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74008
Authors: 
Guerriero, Carmine
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 109.2006
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the effects of supervisors’ (i.e., regulators and judges) selection rules on regulated prices. A checks and balances’ regulatory review process strengthens the role of the judicial power and election increases the populism of implicitly motivated supervisors. Election arises when the risk related to expropriation of sunk investments and the inter-party distance are lower. Employing U.S. electric power market’s data, the empirical evidence strongly confirms these predictions. Indeed, when treated as endogenous, only the election of administrative law judges and not the one of regulators significantly lowers the level of electricity rates. Moreover a more effective supervision technology shows a marginal negative effect on regulated rates as well.
Subjects: 
Election
Agency
Judges
Regulation
Electricity
JEL: 
K23
L51
Q43
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.