Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/74000 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 77.2006
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
A stable government is by definition not dominated by any other government. However, it may happen that all governments are dominated. In graph-theoretic terms this means that the dominance graph does not possess a source. In this paper we are able to deal with this case by a clever combination of notions from different fields, such as relational algebra, graph theory, social choice and bargaining theory, and by using the computer support system RelView for computing solutions and visualizing the results. Using relational algorithms, in such a case we break all cycles in each initial strongly connected component by removing the vertices in an appropriate minimum feedback vertex set. So, we can choose an un-dominated government. To achieve unique solutions, we additionally apply social choice rules. The main parts of our procedure can be executed using the RelView tool. Its sophisticated implementation of relations allows to deal with graph sizes that are sufficient for practical applications of coalition formation.
Schlagwörter: 
Graph Theory
RELVIEW
Relational Algebra
Dominance
Stable Government
JEL: 
D85
C63
C88
D71
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
448.98 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.