Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73970 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 97.2006
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the effect of the intellectual property rights (IPR) regime of a host country (South) on a multinational's decision between serving a market via greenfield foreign direct investment to avoid the exposure of its technology or entering a joint venture (JV) with a local firm, which allows R&D spillovers under imperfect IPRs. JV is the equilibrium market structure when R&D intensity is moderate and IPRs strong. The South can gain from increased IPR protection by encouraging a JV, whereas policies to limit foreign ownership in a JV gain importance in technology intensive industries as complementary policies to strong IPRs.
Schlagwörter: 
Joint Ventures
Intellectual Property Rights
Technology Transfer
R&D Spillovers
FDI Policy
JEL: 
O34
F23
O32
F13
L24
O24
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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