Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73943
Authors: 
Finus, Michael
v. Mouche, Pierre
Rundshagen, Bianca
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 23.2005
Abstract: 
We provide an existence and a uniqueness result for coalitional equilibria of a game in strategic form. Both results are illustrated for a public good game and a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly game.
Subjects: 
Existence and uniqueness of coalitional equilibrium
Game in strategic form
JEL: 
C71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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