Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73904
Authors: 
Dimitrov, Dinko
Haake, Claus-Jochen
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 72.2006
Abstract: 
We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict core of the game is nonempty.
Subjects: 
Coalition Formation
Paradox of Smaller Coalitions
Semistrict Core
Simple Games
Winning Coalitions
JEL: 
D72
C71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.