Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73901
Authors: 
Vannetelbosch, Vincent
Mauleon, Ana
Sempere-Monerris, José
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 49.2005
Abstract: 
We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability and efficiency of R&D collaboration networks in an oligopolistic industry with three firms. Whenever firms settle wages, the complete network is always pairwise stable and the partially connected network is stable if and only if spillovers are large enough. If spillovers are small, the complete network is the efficient network; otherwise, the efficient network is the partially connected network. Thus, a conflict between stability and efficiency may occur: efficient networks are pairwise stable, but the reverse is not true. Strong stability even reinforces this conflict. However, once unions settle wages such conflict disappears: the complete network is the unique pairwise and strongly stable network and is the efficient network whatever the spillovers.
Subjects: 
Networks
R&D collaboration
Oligopoly
Unions
JEL: 
C70
L13
L20
J50
J52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.