Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73889 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics No. 2012-03
Verlag: 
University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon), Innsbruck
Zusammenfassung: 
Evidence on behavior of experts in credence goods markets raises an important causality issue: Do ”fair prices” induce ”good behavior”, or do ”good experts” post ”fair prices”? To answer this question we propose and test a model with three seller types: ”the good” choose fair prices and behave consumer-friendly; ”the bad” mimic the good types’ price-setting, but cheat on quality; and ”the naive” fall victim to a projection bias that all sellers behave like the bad types. OLS, sample selection and fixed effects regressions support the model’s predictions and show that causality goes from good experts to fair prices.
Schlagwörter: 
credence goods
experts
pricing
experiment
other regarding preferences
signalling
projection bias
JEL: 
C91
L15
D82
D40
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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